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NOTE 
Corporate Life After Death: CERCLA Preemption of State 
Corporate Dissolution Law 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act ("CERCLA")1 was enacted by Congress in 1980 to pro-
vide for the cleanup of hazardous substances that have been released 
into the environment. CERCLA imposes liability for cleanup costs on 
those responsible for generating, transporting, or disposing of such 
hazardous substances.2 CERCLA also established a "Superfund" fi-
nanced jointly by the federal government and the petrochemical in-
dustry to compensate the federal and state governments for cleanup of 
hazardous substances when responsible parties cannot be found or are 
unable to finance cleanup themselves. 3 In passing CERCLA, Con-
gress sought to minimize the public health risk posed by hazardous 
wastes through imposing liability for cleanup costs on those who were 
responsible for, or have benefited from, careless disposal of hazardous 
substances. 4 
Occasionally, a corporation deemed a responsible party under 
CERCLA will have dissolved sometime before a CERCLA claim was 
filed against it. Typically, state law prevents a corporation from suing 
or being sued more than two years after dissolution. 5 If dissolution 
stands as a bar to imposing liability under CERCLA, however, many 
responsible parties will be able to escape liability simply by dissolving. 
This Note discusses CERCLA's preemption of state corporate dis-
solution law. Although CERCLA contains a preemption clause in-
tended to specify CERCLA's relationship with other laws, this clause 
I. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) 
(codified in scattered sections of IO, 26 & 42 U.S.C.). SARA made some substantive changes to 
CERCLA and extended it for five years. 
2. CERCLA § l07(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987). 
3. The Superfund is known officially as the Hazardous Substance Superfund. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9507 (Supp. IV 1986). The procedure through which federal and state governments can make 
claims against the Superfund is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9611-12 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
4. CERCLA was designed to "provide that the [Super]fund be financed largely by those 
industries and consumers who profit from products and services associated with the hazardous 
substances which impose risks on society." 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. 
Randolph). See infra Part II.B for a discussion of CERCLA's legislative history. 
5. Some state corporate dissolution statutes do not bar suits against corporations after disso-
lution, and a few contain provisions that allow a corporation to be revived after dissolution for 
the purpose of defending lawsuits. In these states, therefore, corporate dissolution law does not 
stand as an obstacle to CERCLA claims, and the following discussion of preemption by CER-
CLA does not apply. See infra Part III for a discussion of the liability of corporations after 
dissolution. 
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addresses only state laws that impose stricter standards than those 
contained in CERCLA, and does not address state laws that, like dis-
solution laws, remove liability from a party otherwise liable under 
CERCLA. 6 Courts, therefore, have also looked to section 107 of 
CERCLA, which imposes liability against specified parties 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law,"7 to determine 
CERCLA's general relationship with state law. Through such an 
analysis, courts have agreed that CERCLA does preempt certain areas 
of existing state and federal law. 8 
The courts have reached no such agreement, however, as to 
whether CERCLA preempts state corporate dissolution law. In Levin 
Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 9 the Ninth Circuit held, 
based primarily on its understanding of corporate dissolution law, that 
CERCLA does not preempt this area of state law and that the dis-
solved corporation was not liable. In reaching the opposite conclu-
sion, a United States district court in Utah expressly refused to follow 
the Ninth Circuit and held, in United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 10 
that CERCLA does preempt state corporate dissolution law. In a sim-
ilar case, a United States district court in Massachusetts held that a 
dissolved corporation could be held liable under CERCLA based on a 
unique feature of Massachusetts corporate law that allows for revival 
of a dissolved corporation for the purpose of defending suits. 11 
Part I of this Note examines the cases that have held that CER-
CLA preempts existing law in certain aspects of state "minifund" leg-
islation, the federal common law of hazardous substance release, and 
6. "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from 
imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous sub-
stances within such State." CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1982). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987). 
8. Some courts have agreed that CERCLA preempts the federal common law of hazardous 
waste release that existed before CERCLA. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 
F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), affd., 
688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). Several courts have also held that CERCLA preempts state tort 
claims immunity acts. United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 686 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Ind. 
1988); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 
1985). Finally, the Supreme Court has held that pre-SARA CERCLA partially preempted New 
Jersey minifund legislation. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986). 
9. 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra notes 136-
39 and accompanying text. 
10. 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987). For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra notes 
90-93, 140-43 and accompanying text. 
11. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 
F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987). In this case, a defendant corporation had been dissolved for almost 
three years at the time suit was filed. The plaintiffs took advantage of a feature of Massachusetts 
corporate dissolution law that allows the Secretary of State to revive a corporation that has 
terminated in any manner "for all purposes or for any specified purpose ••. with or without 
limitations of time .... " MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 108 (1988). Because the corporation could 
be sued under state law, CERCLA preemption of that law was not addressed by the court. 675 
F. Supp. at 37-41. 
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state tort claims immunity acts. 12 This Part concludes that courts rec-
ognize the comprehensive nature of CERCLA and respect Congress' 
broad remedial intent by holding that CERCLA preempts federal and 
state laws that frustrate the fulfillment of CERCLA's goals. Part II 
explores CERCLA's language and legislative history and argues that, 
although CERCLA's language is far from clear, its legislative history 
shows that Congress clearly intended to tackle the large problem of 
inactive hazardous waste sites through imposing the cost of cleanup on 
the parties responsible for generating, transporting, or disposing the 
wastes. Part II concludes that CERCLA's language and legislative 
history compel a holding that it preempts state corporate dissolution 
law. 
In Part III, this Note analyzes the liability of dissolved corpora-
tions for pre-dissolution and post-dissolution claims under common 
law and state statutes, using the Model Business Corporation Act's13 
dissolution provision as an example. This Part next examines how 
CERCLA claims fit into the general framework of suits brought 
against dissolved corporations, and demonstrates that CERCLA 
claims cannot be analyzed within the existing statutory framework be-
cause that framework relies on distinctions that are virtually impossi-
ble to make regarding CERCLA claims and that have no relationship 
to CERCLA's language or purpose. Part III concludes that Levin 
Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 14 in which the Ninth 
Circuit held that CERCLA does not preempt state corporate dissolu-
tion law, was based on a misplaced reliance on these distinctions. 
Part IV of this Note proposes a workable solution to the problem 
of CERCLA claims against dissolved corporations. This Part first ex-
amines the competing goals of CERCLA and state corporate dissolu-
tion laws, and concludes that although the goals of the different areas 
conflict, they do share a common ground. Next, this Part analyzes the 
contours of a solution and concludes that although a legislative solu-
tion would best solve the problem, preemption best furthers the com-
peting goals until legislative action is taken. Finally, Part IV examines 
the problems attending preemption and concludes that analogous au-
thority exists to confront these problems and that they are not suffi-
ciently great to overcome the arguments in favor of preemption. 
I. CERCLA PREEMPTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
CERCLA is a federal statute that imposes liability for cleanup 
costs upon those who have generated, transported, or disposed of haz-
12. See infra Part I.A for an example of state minifund legislation and its interaction with 
CERCLA. 
13. A number of state corporate dissolution statutes are based on the MODEL BUSINESS 
CORP. ACT § 105 (1979). See infra Part IIl.A.2. 
14. 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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ardous wastes. 15 CERCLA also established a fund to be used by fed-
eral and state governments to pay for the cleanup of sites where no 
responsible party can be found. 16 Unlike some other federal statutes 
that contain express provisions allowing for preemption of state law, 17 
CERCLA contains no preemption clause that addresses whether state 
law may remove liability from a party otherwise liable under 
CERCLA. 18 
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, federal preemption 
of state law may be based on one of three theories: 
First, in enacting the federal law, Congress may explicitly define the ex-
tent to which it intends to pre-empt state law. Second, even in the ab-
sence of express pre-emptive language, Congress may indicate an intent 
to occupy an entire field of regulation, in which case the States must 
leave all regulatory activity in that area to the Federal Government. Fi-
nally, if Congress has not displaced state regulation entirely, it may 
nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent that the state law actually 
conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when compliance with 
both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law "stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress."19 
This Part examines how these theories have been applied to CER-
CLA. Section A discusses the Supreme Court's application of the ex-
press preemption doctrine to New Jersey's state minifund legislation in 
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt. 20 While there is no language in CERCLA that 
would support a similar finding of express preemption with respect to 
state corporate dissolution law, that case usefully elucidates some 
15. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987), provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set 
forth in subsection (b) of this section -(1) the owner and operator of .•• a facility, (2) any 
person who at the time of disposal of any h11zardous substance owned or operated any facil· 
ity at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who ••. arranged 
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances ... and, (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazard-
ous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities ..• or sites •.. from which 
there is a release ... of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for - (A) all costs of removal 
or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State ... (B) any other 
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person ..• [and] (C) damages for injury to, 
destruction of, or loss of natural resources ... resulting from such a release ..•• 
16. CERCLA §§ 112-13, 131, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9611-12 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
17. See, e.g., the preemption clause contained in the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982). For a discussion of this clause, see infra notes 
62-63. 
18. Pre-SARA CERCLA contained a provision prohibiting the states from taxing corpora-
tions to establish funds that would pay for the same costs payable by CERCLA's Superfund. 42 
U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1982). This provision was deleted by SARA. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 114(a), 
100 Stat. 1652 (1986). CERCLA also contains a clause stating that CERCLA does not prevent 
states from imposing additional liability with respect to the release of hazardous substances 
within that state. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1982). 
19. Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 
469 (1983) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (citations omitted). 
20. 475 U.S. 355 (1986). This case is discussed more fully at infra note 23. 
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more general principles regarding CERCLA preemption of state laws. 
Section B discusses courts' application of the "occupation of the field" 
theory to find that CERCLA preempts the federal common law of 
hazardous substance release.21 While there is no indication that CER-
CLA occupies the field of corporate dissolution, analysis of these cases 
evidences judicial recognition of congressional intent to provide a 
comprehensive set of regulations to solve a large-scale national prob-
lem. Logical extension of these policy consi~erations supports CER-
CLA preemption of state corporate dissolution law because 
preemption would allow a greater number of sites to be cleaned up 
with funds provided by responsible parties. · 
Section C discusses the application of the third preemption ap-
proach, preemption when state law stands as an obstacle to the fulfill-
ment of congressional purpose. That approach has been consistently 
applied to find CERCLA preemption of state tort claims immunity 
acts.22 Section C argues that state corporate dissohltion law ought to 
be preempted by CERCLA for much the same reason. 
A. CERCLA Preemption of State Minifund Legislation Through 
Express Preemption: The Exxon Case 
In Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 23 both the New Jersey Supreme Court 
and, on appeal, the United States Supreme Court confronted the issue 
of CERCLA preemption of a state minifund statute. The New Jersey 
Spill Act, 24 a type of state minifund legislation, was passed before 
CERCLA and was designed to respond to the problem of hazardous 
substance release. At issue in the Exxon case was a preemption clause 
then contained in section 114(c) of CERCLA, which stated: 
Except as provided in this chapter, no person may be required to con-
tribute to any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation for 
claims for any costs of response or damages or claims which may be 
compensated under this subchapter. Nothing in this section shall pre-
clude any State from using general revenues for such a fund, or from 
imposing a tax or fee upon any person or upon any substance in order to 
finance the purchase or prepositioning of hazardous substance response 
equipment or other preparations for the response to a release of hazard-
21. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding 
that CERCLA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6901-
97 (1982), provide such a comprehensive set of regulations that the federal common Jaw is pre-
empted); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), ajfd., 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 
1982) (same). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 686 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Ind. 1988) 
(finding CERCLA preemption of state tort claims immunity act); Artesian Water Co. v. Govern-
ment of New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 1985) (same). 
23. 475 U.S. 355 (1986). 
24. New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.ll to 
58:10-23.llz (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). 
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ous substances which affects such State.25 
The New Jersey Spill Fund was established through an excise tax on 
major petroleum producers and chemical facilities in the state. Some 
of these companies brought suit contending that the spill tax was ex-
pressly preempted by CERCLA section 114(c). New Jersey, however, 
maintained that the phrase "which may be compensated under this 
subchapter" only covered expenses actually paid by the Superfund.26 
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the state's argument and 
held that since the New Jersey Spill Act covered expenses not covered 
by the Superfund,27 the Spill Act was not preempted by CERCLA.28 
The United States Supreme Court reversed in part, stating that the 
phrase "may be compensated" must be given its ordinary meaning.29 
According to Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, "[t]o say that 
the only expenses that 'may be compensated' are those that are com-
pensated twists both language and logic further than we are willing to 
go."30 Reviewing the legislative history of CERCLA, the Court deter-
mined that cleaning up the nation's hazardous waste spills as effec-
tively as possible was not CERCLA's only purpose.31 For example, 
the Court noted, section 114(c) of CERCLA reflected congressional 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1982) (emphasis added). This provision was deleted by SARA, 
Pub. L. No. 99-499, § I14(a), 100 Stat. 1652 (1986). 
26. Justice Stevens accepted this stance, arguing that "for the purpose of" should not be 
construed to mean for the sole purpose of and that a state fund created for purposes that over-
lapped with the purposes of CERCLA was not preempted by § l 14(a). 475 U.S. at 377, 380-82 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). When Congress passed SARA and deleted § 114(c) it stated that it 
intended this more narrow preemptive effect. Irr deleting the provision, Congress wished to make 
clear that the only preemption of state Jaw intended in the area of minifunds was that of claims 
actually compensated by the Superfund. "[T]he proper interpretation of current law is that its 
preemption provision was intended only to preclude states from imposing taxes or otherwise 
requiring contributions to funds which would pay costs or damages that would be actually com-
pensated by Superfund." H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-84, reprinted in 1986 
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2865-66. Some of the literature before Exxon argued 
for this view. See, e.g., Note, The Preemptive Scope of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980: Necessity for An Active State Role, 34 U. FLA. 
L. REV. 635 (1982) (pre-Exxon argument that states should be able to establish minifunds to 
compensate claims not compensated under CERCLA); Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the 
Environmental Context: A Unified Method of Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 208-10 (1978) 
(pre-CERCLA argument that in an analysis of federal preemption of environmental law there 
should be a strong presumption for concurrent state and federal roles). But see Funk, Federal 
and State Superfunds: Cooperative Federalism or Federal Preemption, 16 ENVTL. L.J. 1, 37 
(1985) ("In construing section l 14(c) ... the duty of the courts should be to give faithful effect to 
the legislative compromise, not to make the law as effective or efficient as possible."). 
27. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the New Jersey Spill Fund compensated par-
ties for containment costs not covered by the federal Superfund. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 97 N.J. 
526, 543-44, 481 A.2d 271, 280-81 (1984), modified, 475 U.S. 355 (1986). 
28. 97 N.J. at 544, 481 A.2d at 281. 
29. 475 U.S. at 374. 
30. 475 U.S. at 372 (emphasis in.original). 
31. 475 U.S. at 372. Some commentators have made a similar point. See Funk, supra note 
26, at 37 (CERCLA represents a congressional compromise between competing goals, and this 
compromise should not be disturbed by the courts even if it means that the legislation will not be 
as effective as possible). 
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concern about overtaxing the petrochemical industry.32 The Court 
held, therefore, that the New Jersey Spill Act was preempted for any 
costs that were reimbursable by both the New Jersey Law and 
CERCLA.33 
The Exxon case shows that the congressional purpose underlying 
CERCLA was multifaceted: cleaning up hazardous wastes was not 
the sole concern of Congress. Although the Court in this case held 
that CERCLA preempted a state law that imposed additional liability 
on parties in the hazardous waste industry, this holding suggests that 
the Court respects the balancing of goals reflected in CERCLA. Sec-
tion 114(c) of CERCLA contained language that, according to the 
Court, evidenced congressional concern with imposing a double tax on 
the chemical industry. There is no indication of a corresponding con-
cern for the burden on corporations that have dissolved without pro-
viding for any potential environmental liability. 
B. CERCLA Preemption of the Federal Common Law of 
Hazardous Substance Release Through "Occupation 
of the Field" 
Prior to CERCLA's enactment, some federal district courts had 
created a federal common law of hazardous substance release. 34 This 
evolved from a federal common law of interstate air and water 
pollution. 35 
32. 475 U.S. at 372. That Congress subsequently deleted this provision ofCERCLA, thereby 
allowing states to impose additional liability on the chemical industry may evidence that Con-
gress was not as concerned with overburdening that industry as the Court believed. See supra 
note 26. 
33. According to the Court's determination, the reimbursement provided for by both CER-
CLA and the New Jersey Spill Act that was preempted was "to finance governmental cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites" and "to reimburse third parties for cleanup costs." 475 U.S. at 375-76. 
However, the remaining four costs reimbursed by the New Jersey statute, "to compensate third 
parties for cleanup costs; ... to compensate third parties for damage resulting from hazardous 
substance discharges; ... to pay personnel and equipment costs; ... to administer the fund itself 
and to conduct research," were not contained within CERCLA and hence were permissible. 475 
U.S. at 375. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the New Jersey court to determine if the 
preempted provisions of the Spill Act were severable from the remainder of the statute. 475 U.S. 
at 376-77. That court held the provision to be severable. 109 N.J. 110, 534 A.2d l, 20 ERC 
1953, 18 ENvr'L L. REP. 20,412 (1987). 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980) 
(holding that the federal common law of nuisance provides standards for determining what con-
duct with respect to hazardous wastes constitutes an "imminent and substantial endangerment to 
health or the environment" under section 7003 of the RCRA). 
35. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) ("Milwaukee I"), the Court held that 
a water pollution claim by the state of Illinois against four Wisconsin cities and the sewerage 
commissions of the City and the County of Milwaukee could be decided based on a federal 
common Jaw created by the courts. This holding was based on previous case Jaw and the enact-
ment of federal law in the area of water pollution that evidenced a federal interest in regulating 
the area. Although the Court in Milwaukee I held that the federal common law governed, it 
refused original jurisdiction and remanded the case to a federal district court to decide the sub-
stantive issue. 406 U.S. at 108. See also Note, The Hazardous Waste Regulatory Programs and 
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Less than one year after CERCLA went into effect, a New Jersey 
district court stated, in United States v. Price, 36 that CERCLA and its 
precursor, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
("RCRA"), 37 provide such a comprehensive set of regulations in the 
area of hazardous substance release that the federal common law in 
this area was preempted.38 In Price, the government's claim for in-
junctive relief against the owner of a toxic waste site for pollution of 
groundwater was based on RCRA and the federal common law of 
hazardous waste disposal. Although skeptical that a common law of 
hazardous waste release had ever existed, the Price court acknowl-
edged that other courts had based decisions on the existence of a fed-
eral common law of hazardous waste release, 3!1 and held that the 
common law was preempted by RCRA and CERCLA. 
A Pennsylvania district court subsequently reached the same hold-
ing on preemption through a more rigorous approach. In City of Phil-
adelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 40 the court discussed the purposes of 
RCRA and CERCLA before determining that, together, these federal 
statutes preempted the federal common law of hazardous substance 
release.41 In reaching this holding, the court analogized to the area of 
interstate water pollution where the Supreme Court had already held 
that the "Clean Water Act"42 provided such a comprehensive set of 
regulations that the federal common law was preempted through "oc-
cupation of the field."43 RCRA and CERCLA provided an equally 
the Federal Common Law of Nuisance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 791 (1984) (describing the emergence of 
the federal common Jaw of hazardous waste release). 
36. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981). 
37. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982). RCRA regu-
lates hazardous wastes from "cradle to grave." CERCLA was passed because RCRA does not 
regulate hazardous wastes generated and disposed of before RCRA's enactment. See 126 CONG. 
REC. 26,359 (1980) (statement of Rep. Brown) ("[CERCLA] fiJis a critical gap in current Jaw by 
providing EPA with the authority and resources to clean up inactive hazardous waste sites. 
There is no other authority under which EPA can act at this time."). 
38. 523 F. Supp. at 1069. 
39. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
40. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
41. The court wrote: 
Unquestionably, Congress has occupied the field of hazardous waste disposal. In the RCRA 
it has comprehensively set forth the standards which are to govern every aspect of this 
activity from generation to disposal. In CERCLA, it has established a system of responding 
to releases or threatened releases from hazardous dumpsites, mandated the adoption of an 
extensive plan to govern such responses, and imposed a standard of strict liability on those 
parties involved in the disposal of hazardous waste. 
544 F. Supp. at 1148. But see Note, supra note 35, at 805-10 (arguing that Congress did not 
intend to preempt all federal common law through RCRA and CERCLA). 
42. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 
(1982 & Supp. 1987). 
43. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) ("Milwaukee II") (holding that the 
Clean Water Act preempts the federal common law of nuisance as to interstate waterways); see 
also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (Milwaukee 
II holding extended to poIIution of coastal waters). 
October 1989) Note - CERCLA Preemption 139 
comprehensive level of coverage in the area of hazardous substance 
release and therefore the federal common law in this area must also be 
preempted. 44 
The cases that address CERCLA preemption of the federal com-
mon law of hazardous substance release based on an "occupation-of-
the-field" theory evidence the courts' recognition of a congressional 
intention to remedy the substantial problem of hazardous substance 
release through the enactment of CERCLA and RCRA.45 Although 
these cases provide little direct support for CERCLA preemption of 
state corporate dissolution law, they do show a judicial recognition of 
the need expressed by Congress for a consistent, national scheme to 
solve the proble.m. 
C. CERCLA Preemption of State Tort Claims Immunity Acts: 
State Law as an Obstacle to the Fulfillment 
ofCERCLA's Goals 
Tort claims immunity acts are common provisions of state law that 
provide immunity for state and local governmental bodies from tort 
liability.46 All courts that have addressed this issue have agreed that 
44. 544 F. Supp. at 1147. 
45. Although based on now-questionable precedent, one district court held, in Allied Towing 
Corp. v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp., that CERCLA and RCRA do not preempt the state 
common law of hazardous waste release. 642 F. Supp. 1339, 1350-52 (E.D. Va. 1986). The 
Allied court held that the "savings" clause ofRCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1982), and its legisla-
tive history prohibit a holding of preemption of the state or federal common law. 642 F. Supp. at 
1351. In addition, the court concluded that there was "nothing in the legislative history ofCER-
CLA" that would support preemption. 642 F. Supp. at 1352. One commentator has made a 
similar argument regarding CERCLA preemption of state common law remedies. Glicksman, 
Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (1985). 
Professor Glicksman argues that the federal courts should strive to promote legitimacy, individ-
ual liberty, accommodation, and efficiency, in deciding whether federal environmental statutes 
preempt state common-law remedies. Using such an analysis, Glicksman concludes that 
CERCLA and RCRA do not preempt state common law remedies either for intrastate or inter-
state harm. Id. at 213-21. · 
The validity of the Allied decision is questionable because the Supreme Court held in Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), that the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (which has a savings clause identical to RCRA's), preempts state 
common law actions unless the action is based on stricter regulations promulgated by the state in 
which the source of the pollution is located. Because the Clean Water Act, like RCRA and 
CERCLA, allows states to pass more stringent regulations for intrastate activity than those pro-
vided by the federal statute, these intrastate common law remedies may be enforced. Professors 
Levy and Glicksman have argued that Ouellette is typical of the Supreme Court's recent trend in 
environmental law decisions that reach a pro-development result by retreating from the Court's 
usual presumption against preemption of state law remedies. Levy & Glicksman, Judicial Activ-
ism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 
396-404 (1989). One student commentator has maintained that CERCLA does not preempt 
state common law remedies notwithstanding the Ouellette decision because of the different struc-
ture of CERCLA as compared to the Clean Water Act. Comment, Federal Preemption of State 
Law Environmental Remedies After International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 49 LA. L. REV. 193, 
207-10 (1988). 
46. An example of such a provision in Michigan law provides: "Except as in this act other-
wise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein 
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CERCLA preempts state tort claims immunity acts.47 These cases 
provide a strong analogy for CERCLA claims against dissolved cor-
porations because in both instances, a state law removes liability from 
a party otherwise liable under CERCLA. 
The first case to hold that CERCLA preempts state tort claims 
immunity acts was Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle 
County. 48 In this case, a private water company sued New Castle 
County for the pollution of its well field caused by toxic substances 
that had been dumped into a nearby landfill owned by the county. 
The county asserted that it was immune from suit based on the Dela-
ware County and Municipal Tort Claims Act ("Tort Claims Act").49 
However, the Delaware district court held that, regardless of whether 
the plaintiff's CERCLA claims could be characterized as tort 
claims, so the Tort Claims Act did not bar them because the state law 
was in conflict with the federal statute and thus, under the Supremacy 
Clause, had to fail.SI 
In a subsequent case, United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 52 
an Indiana district court held, with minimal discussion, that a city and 
city agency defendants could not take advantage of the Indiana Tort 
Claims Act in a CERCLA proceeding because the state law was pre-
empted by CERCLA. s3 
The cases addressing CERCLA preemption of state tort claims im-
the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function." 
MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 691.1407 (1979). 
47. Also, the eleventh amendment does not bar CERCLA suits against states for cleanup 
costs because CERCLA's language shows that Congress intended for states to be liable under 
CERCLA. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co, 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). 
48. 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 1985). 
49. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4010-13 (Supp. 1988). This Act provides explicitly for gov-
ernmental immunity from damage claims resulting from the sudden and accidental release of 
pollutants into the air or any body of water. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 401 l(b)(3), 4012(3) 
(Supp. 1988). 
50. The issue of whether CERCLA claims are tort claims seeking recovery of damages was 
unresolved by the courts; because the court here found preemption, it did not have to reach the 
issue. 605 F. Supp. at 1354. 
51. 605 F. Supp. at 1354. The court stated: 
In the case at bar, federal law mandates that political subdivisions be legally responsible, 
inter a/ia, for response costs incurred in taking removal or remedial actions at sites owned or 
operated by such political subdivisions; state law purports to say that they are not so liable. 
If this is not an actual conflict situation, it clearly is one in which Delaware's Tort Claims 
Act stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives which 
Congress sought to fulfill in enacting CERCLA. Therefore, the Tort Claims Act is 
preempted. 
605 F. Supp. at 1354. Nevertheless, Artesian's claim against the county was eventually dismissed 
because Artesian had not obtained governmental approval of its remedial action prior to in-
curring cleanup costs. 605 F. Supp. at 1362. 
52. 686 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Ind. 1988). 
53. The Seymour Recycling court noted that "(t]he Indiana Tort Claims Act does not apply 
to defendants' contribution claims since the claims were brought under a federal statute, CER-
CLA. CERCLA preempts state tort claims statutes." 686 F. Supp. at 700 (citing Artesian Water 
Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1354-55). 
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munity acts provide strong precedent for CERCLA preemption of 
state corporate dissolution law. In both areas, a state law removes all 
liability from a certain class of defendants, in the one case governmen-
tal bodies and in the other case dissolved corporations. The courts 
have held that CERCLA preempts state tort claims immunity acts be-
cause otherwise these laws stand as an obstacle to the fulfillment of 
CERCLA's purposes. Directly analogous to this, state corporate dis-
solution law, which removes all liability from a class of parties other-
wise liable under CERCLA, must be preempted by CERCLA or else 
the fulfillment of the congressional intent reflected in CERCLA will be 
frustrated. 
Overall, an examination of CERCLA preemption through the 
three theories of preemption as applied to the areas of state minifund 
legislation, federal common law, and state torts claims immunity acts 
demonstrates that courts are very receptive to preemption. Signifi-
cantly, the courts that have found preemption recognize the broad 
congressional purpose of solving the large problem of hazardous sub-
stance release through comprehensive federal legislation. Such find-
ings should lead to federal preemption of any state law that frustrates 
the fulfillment of this purpose. 
II. CERCLA's PREEMPTION LANGUAGE AND 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Although an analysis of case law with respect to CERCLA pre-
emption of other laws sheds some light on the present issue, it is not 
dispositive. In analyzing whether CERCLA preempts state corporate 
dissolution law, it is necessary to determine whether state corporate 
dissolution law stands as an obstacle to the fulfillment of congressional 
objectives in passing CERCLA. 54 This Part discusses congressional 
intent in passing CERCLA. This may be gleaned in part from the 
language of the statute itself and, to a greater extent, from an examina-
tion of CERCLA's legislative history. Section A examines the lan-
guage of the statute, and concludes that it does not clearly compel 
preemption. Section B examines the statute's legislative history. 
Although CERCLA's passage through Congress was hasty,55 recur-
ring themes surface throughout the congressional debates and provide 
some information about Congress' purposes in passing CERCLA, pur-
poses that weigh strongly in favor of preemption. Section C discusses 
United States v. Sharon Steel Corp. 56 in which the court relied on this 
54. Of the three theories on which preemption may be based, the only one applicable to 
CERCLA preemption of state corporate dissolution law is that of determining whether the state 
law stands as an obstacle to the fulfillment of the federal law. For a full discussion of this conclu-
sion, see supra Part I. 
55. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' rush to enact 
CERCLA. 
56. 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987). 
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legislative history, found it to be determinative, and held that CER-
CLA preempts state corporate dissolution law. 
A. CERCLA's Preemption Language 
The interpretation of any statute must begin with the language 
contained within the statute itself. 57 Because CERCLA contains no 
applicable preemption clause, courts facing the issue of CERCLA pre-
emption of state tort claims immunity acts-laws which, like corpo-
rate dissolution statutes, remove CERCLA liability from certain 
parties-have focused on CERCLA section 107, which imposes liabil-
ity for cleanup and response costs "[n]otwithstanding any other provi-
sion or rule of law."58 Only one CERCLA case considering 
preemption has addressed specifically the interpretation of the term 
"notwithstanding" found in CERCLA section 107. In United States v. 
Sharon Steel Corp., 59 the court, in holding that CERCLA preempts 
state corporate dissolution law, stated that "[section 107] clearly ex-
presses Congress's intent to supersede any rule that would otherwise 
relieve a responsible party from Iiability."60 
Although this interpretation is supported by a "plain meaning" 
analysis of CERCLA's language, it is difficult to reconcile with the 
omission from CERCLA of broad preemptive language contained in 
other federal statutes. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 ("ERISA"),61 for example, was enacted before CERCLA, and 
contains an extremely broad statement of preemption. 62 One could 
argue that if Congress had intended to give CERCLA broad preemp-
tive effect, including preemption of state corporate dissolution law, it 
would have included a preemption clause in CERCLA similar to that 
found in BRISA. 63 
57. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., con-
curring) ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language 
itself."). 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987); see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
59. 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987). 
60. 681 F. Supp. at 1496. 
61. 29 u.s.c. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). 
62. Section 514 of ERISA contains the following preemption clause: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and 
subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title 
and not exempt under section 1003{b) of this title. 
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982) (emphasis added). 
63. However, even the apparently unequivocal language ofERISA's § 514 has not resulted in 
complete preemption. For example, courts have refused to preempt state family law because of 
the states' paramount interest in that area of law. See Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. 
Cal. 1978), ajfd., 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). ERISA's broad 
preemptive language has also failed to prevent judicial inquiry into whether preemption is war-
ranted in any particular instance. See Irish & Cohen, ER/SA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility 
and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 109, 116 (1985) {"Although section 514(a) seems 
to preempt state law unequivocally, courts have often analyzed section 514 in terms of the tradi-
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Comparison to other statutes, however, could also weigh in favor 
of application of CERCLA to dissolved corporations. CERCLA de-
fines a "person" subject to suit under CERCLA as a "corporation" 
and not as an ongoing corporation. 64 This is in contrast to other laws 
enacted before CERCLA that impose liability only on existing corpo-
rations, thereby exempting corporations that have already dissolved. 65 
Using the above analysis, one could argue that if Congress intended to 
place liability on only ongoing corporations, it would have done so 
clearly. 
An analysis of CERCLA's preemption language produces contra-
dictory results, therefore, and as with the interpretation of many stat-
utes, the plain meaning is only the beginning of the interpretation. 66 
Moreover, it has been widely recognized that CERCLA's language is 
far from an example of clear legislative drafting. 67 Many courts have 
recognized that CERCLA's sometimes muddled language resulted 
tional judicial preemption doctrines that operate independently of any specific statutory preemp-
tion provision."); (citations omitted). In addition, some commentators have suggested that when 
dealing with a Jaw of general application that is not directed at benefit plans, preemption under 
ERISA may rest upon the intensity of the state's interests. See id. at 129 ("In such cases ... it 
sometimes appears that the intensity of the state interest, rather than its 'remoteness' from benefit 
plans, determines whether courts will hold that section 514(a) expresses a 'clear and manifest 
[preemptive] purpose'") (emphasis in original; citations omitted); Kilberg & Inman, Preemption 
of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEXAS 
L. REV. 1313, 1320 (1984) ("Courts often weave into ERISA preemption analysis a considera-
tion of the state interest at stake. Although there is no statutory support for this inquiry, courts 
commonly are 'guided by respect for the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in 
our federalist system.' ") (footnote omitted). 
If courts were to use a similar analysis for CERCLA (assuming the statute contained a broad 
preemption clause like ERISA § 514(a)), courts would consider the strength of the interest fur-
thered by the state law and find preemption where the interest advanced by the federal Jaw is 
stronger than that of the state Jaw. The intensity of the federal interest reflected in CERCLA, as 
measured by congressional concern over the scope of the problem, is very strong and thus few 
state interests should be able to outweigh this important national concern. The state interests 
furthered by corporate dissolution Jaw are especially weak when applied to CERCLA claims 
because of the uncertainty as to whether CERCLA claims are pre-dissolution or post-dissolution 
claims. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text. Therefore, an ERISA-type analysis 
would suggest that where, as in CERCLA, the state interest is weak or not furthered at all by 
application of the state Jaw, and the federal interest is strong, preemption should be the result. 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (Supp. V 1987). 
65. For example, the Sherman Act definition of a "person" subject to suit includes "corpora-
tions and associations existing under or authorized by the Jaws of ... any State.'' 15 U.S.C. § 7 
(1982). This distinction was recognized by the court in United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 
F. Supp. 1492, 1496 n.8 (D. Utah 1987). 
66. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) in which the Supreme Court stated: 
[A]scertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need not end the 
inquiry. This is because the plain-meaning rule is "rather an axiom of experience than a rule 
of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists." The circum-
stances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did 
not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect. 
(citations and footnote omitted). 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) ("CERCLA has 
acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contra-
dictory, legislative history.") (citations omitted). 
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from its whirlwind trip through the last days of the lame duck session 
of the 96th Congress.68 Therefore, most courts have realized that ex-
clusive reliance on the language of the statute is inappropriate and that 
an examination of CERCLA's legislative history is necessary to deter-
mine what Congress intended to accomplish in passing CERCLA. 69 
B. CERCLA's Legislative History 
In 1978, almost three years before CERCLA's enactment, the 
problem of inactive hazardous waste sites was brought to the attention 
of the public and Congress by the events at Love Canal in Niagara 
Falls, New York. 70 The residents of Love Canal discovered that part 
of their subdivision and the neighborhood elementary school had been 
built on a landfill containing highly toxic chemicals that could cause 
birth defects, miscarriages, epilepsy, and other diseases. In August of 
1978, President Carter declared Love Canal a national emergency and 
the State of New York began evacuating the residents.71 
68. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("[CERCLA] leaves 
much to be desired from a syntactical standpoint, perhaps a reflection of the hasty compromises 
which were reached as the bill was pushed through Congress just before the close of the 96th 
session."); State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeolf, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 (N.D. Ohio 1983) ("CER-
CLA was rushed through a lame duck session of Congress, and therefore, might not have re-
ceived adequate drafting."). The legislative history demonstrates that Congress itself realized the 
haste with which it was passing CERCLA. Cf 126 CONG. REC. 31,969 (1980) (statement of 
Rep. Broyhill) ("I have in my hand a three-page list of various defects and technical errors that 
are in this bill .... "); id. at 31,975 (statement of Rep. Snyder) ("Our legislative counsel briefly 
looked at this bill and found 45 technical errors ... in this one bill."). But see id. at 30,936 
(statement of Sen. Stalford) ("In one way or another, 65 or 70 of the 100 Members of the Senate 
have been personally involved in the development of this legislation over a three year period •••• 
That does not count, at least in this Senator's book, as a rush to judgment."). 
69. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1331 ("Any attempt to divine the legisla-
tive intent behind many of [CERCLA's] provisions will inevitably involve a resort to the Act's 
legislative history."). 
70. The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, in reporting on the bill that 
would eventually become CERCLA, noted that Love Canal had spurred Congress into action, 
stating that "shocking incidents at Love Canal gained wide attention and propelled the problems 
of inadequate hazardous chemical waste disposal into the national spotlight .•.. " SENATE 
COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
ACT, s. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT No. 848). 
"The Love Canal tragedy, the most familiar example of the dangers of hazardous substances in 
our society, also paints the clearest picture of just how serious the problems involving toxic 
chemicals can be." Id. at 8. In the discussion of CERCLA on the Senate floor, Senator Moyni-
han of New York asked that a chronology of the events at Love Canal be included in the record. 
126 CONG. REC. 30,937-39 (1980). 
Ironically, because the final version of CERCLA contained no recovery provision for per-
sonal injuries, CERCLA, as enacted, provided no help for the victims of Love Canal. See id. at 
30,942 (statement of Sen. Mitchell explaining why he would vote for CERCLA but with reluc-
tance: "We have the opportunity to help [the victims of Love Canal and other toxic waste acci-
dents] and we have not done that. Instead we have apparently decided that, as the chemical 
industry says, toxic chemicals are a societal problem .... "). 
71. Love Canal, U.S.A., N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, § 6 (Magazine) at 23, reprinted in LI-
BRARY OF CONGRESS FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
SPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), PUBLIC LAW 96-510 8-9 
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In late 1980, members of the lame duck session of the 96th Con-
gress, having discussed for the previous three years legislation that 
would remedy the problem of inactive hazardous waste sites, became 
concerned that if legislation were not passed before the end of the ses-
sion, it might never be passed. 72 The final version of the bill that be-
came CERCLA was a compromise worked out by an ad hoc bi-
partisan group of Senators. 73 This compromise bill was passed by the 
Senate and placed before the House in the form of an amendment to 
an earlier House bill. 74 The measure was considered by the House on 
December 3, 1980, in the last days of the session, and was passed with 
limited debate, under a suspension of the rules with no amendments 
allowed. 75 As noted by one commentator, "[t]aced with a complicated 
bill on a take it or leave it basis, the House took it, groaning all the 
way."76 
Because of its hasty passage, courts have very little legislative his-
tory to guide them in interpreting CERCLA; for many provisions 
there is contradictory history77 or no history at all. For example, 
there is no direct discussion of the language of CERCLA's section 
107, which imposes liability "[n]otwithstanding any other provision or 
rule of law."78 The only reference to CERCLA's relationship with 
state law is found in the discussions of section 114(c), which, prior to 
its deletion, prevented states from taxing companies for purposes cov-
ered by the Superfund,79 and of section 114(a), which allows states to 
(Comm. Print 1983). At least 306 families were eventually relocated from Love Canal at govern-
ment expense. 126 CONG. REC. 30,939 (1980). 
72. See 126 CONG. REC. 30,941 (1980) (statement of Sen. Mitchell) ("The choice is between 
this compromise and no bill [on toxic waste disposal] at all."); id. at 31,968-69 (statement of Rep. 
Florio) ("[N]ow at the 11th hour [the Senate] has sent us a bill that we must act upon in order to 
have this bill enacted into law .... The concern is whether we are going to have legislation or 
whether we [are] not going to have legislation."). 
73. See s. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 CONG. REC. 30,782-96 (1980). 
74. 126 CONG. REC. 30,956, 30,987 (1980). 
75. Id. at 31,950-82. 
76. IA F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW§ 4A.04[2] 1981, reprinted in Grad, 
A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
("Superfund'? Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. I (1982). 
77. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Unfortunately 
[CERCLA's] legislative history is unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory state-
ments."); Grad, supra note 76, at 2 ("In the instance of the 'Superfund' legislation, a hastily 
assembled bill and a fragmented legislative history add to the usual difficulty of discerning the 
full meaning of the law."); Comment, Generator Liability Under Superfund For Clean-up Of 
Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1229, 1242 (1982) ("Ascertaining 
'congressional intent' from such a patch-work bill [CERCLA] is a complex, if not impossible 
task."). 
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987). See supra note 15 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of this provision. 
79. CERCLA § 114(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1982). Section l 14(c) was interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986). See supra Part I.A for a discussion 
of the Exxon case. 
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impose additional liability for intrastate harms. 80 No discussion ap-
pears in the legislative history, however, about whether a state law 
that completely removes liability from a class of potential defendants 
would be preempted by CERCLA. 
Despite this lack of detailed guidance, some clear elements of con-
gressional intent are contained in CERCLA and have been recognized 
by courts interpreting CERCLA. First of all, the history shows that 
Congress was concerned about, the magnitude of the problem posed 
by inactive hazardous waste sites. 81 Second, the record clearly shows 
that Congress created the Superfund in order to institute a mechanism 
by which government could act immediately to clean up waste sites 
before litigation resolved who would eventually be liable for the 
costs. 82 Finally, statements by members on the floor demonstrate that 
Congress intended to impose the costs of cleanup on those who were 
responsible for the creation, transportation, and disposal of the haz-
ardous substances. 83 A number of courts have observed these same 
purposes behind CERCLA. 84 
One court, in State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeojf, 85 has recognized 
that CERCLA manifests the further congressional goal of cost spread-
ing among responsible parties. In Brown, the defendant transporters 
of toxic wastes argued that any retroactive liability Congress intended 
to impose through CERCLA was to be imposed through the taxes 
levied on the industry to create the Superfund, rather than through 
80. CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (Supp. V 1987). 
81. Throughout the Senate Committee report and the floor debate, numerous references were 
made to a report submitted by the EPA stating that in 1980 there were at least 2,000 dumpsites 
that posed a threat to the public health and that the average cost of cleanup per site would be 
$3.6 million. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT No. 848, supra note 70, at 2; 126 CONG. REC. 30,934 
(1980) (statement of Sen. Stafford). 
82. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 30,939-40 (1980) (statement of Sen. Bradley) ("[A] single 
mechanism is established to permit Government to pay cleanup costs resulting from releases of 
hazardous substances into the environment . . . . [T]he legislation provides for emergency re· 
sponse without creating an elaborate regulatory bureaucracy."). 
83. See id. at 30,971 (statement of Sen. Chafee) ("Governments must have a tool for holding 
liable those who are responsible for [cleanup] costs."); id. at 30,940 (statement of Sen. Tsongas) 
("[CERCLA] puts the costs on the sector most responsible for pollution and which benefits most 
from chemical production .... "); id. at 30,941 (statement of Sen. Mitchell) ("The guiding prin-
ciple of those who wrote S. 1480 was that those found responsible for harm caused by chemical 
contamination should pay for the costs of that harm."). 
84. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("What is clear 
... is that [CERCLA] is intended to facilitate the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste dump 
sites and when possible to place the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible for the 
danger created by such sites."); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. I JOO, 
1112 (D. Minn. 1982) ("A review of [CERCLA] and the Committee Reports reveals at least two 
Congressional concerns that survived the final amendments to the Act. First, Congress intended 
that the federal government be immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective 
response to problems of national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, 
Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons 
bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created."). 
85. State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983). 
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private suits to recover cleanup costs. The court disagreed, holding 
that, in passing CERCLA, Congress considered the creation of the 
Superfund to be only part of the solution to the problem of hazardous 
waste cleanup and that private actions for cleanup cost recovery 
would be necessary as well. 86 Furthermore, in response to the trans-
porters' other argument that they should not be held liable for cleanup 
costs because the generators of the materials and the owner-operators 
of dump sites were more responsible for the hazardous materials than 
were the transporters, the court held that Congress intended CER-
CLA to act as a form of cost spreading among responsible parties. 87 
. The contention that CERCLA was intended to be a cost-spreading 
mechanism is supported by comment~ made during the debates on the 
House floor concerning assertions of the chemical industry that taxing 
them to provide for the Superfund would only mean increased costs to 
consumers. Representative Brown of California responded that this 
was an equitable internalization of costs to compensate for previous 
benefits gained by the industry and its consumers from past cheap dis-
posal of hazardous wastes. 88 
The legislative history of CERCLA, therefore, shows that Con-
gress was attempting to make an immediate response to the large 
problem of inactive hazardous wastes sites that would ultimately 
spread cleanup costs among the parties who had benefited from the 
hazardous wastes. Although not all courts have been persuaded by 
these goals, 89 other courts have recognized them. 
C. An Example of Judicial Application of CERCLA's Legislative 
History: United States v. Sharon Steel Corp. 
An examination of CERCLA's language and legislative history 
was central to a Utah district court's holding in United States v. 
86. In reaching this conclusion, the court explained that "Congress probably believed there 
would be a substantial percentage of judgment proof defendants in these actions. Congress could 
not have intended to limit the potential defendants while accomplishing its purpose of making 
the responsible individuals pay for the cost of clean up." 562 F. Supp. at 1313. 
87. 562 F. Supp. at 1313 ("Assuming arguendo that the cost of clean up [of all hazardous 
waste sites] could be held to $10 billion, 84% of that cost must be recovered from sources other 
than the Superfund to complete the job."). 
88. Representative Brown stated: 
[The amount allocated to the Superfund] by no means would cover nearly the number of 
sites that need work, but would allow work to begin on the most urgent cases .•.. 
[T]here is no equitable reason why the cost of the cleanup of hazardous waste sites 
should be the burden of the taxpayers. Industry points out correctly that the cost will be 
passed on to the consumer; this simply means that the true cost of a product in its broad 
sense will include the hidden costs which were previously omitted. This seems to me to be 
the only reasonable solution to a problem brought on by past improper waste disposal 
practices. 
126 CONG. REC. 26,359 (1980). 
89. The Ninth Circuit, for example, in Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 
817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) was not persuaded by CERCLA's legislative history. See infra 
Part III.B. 
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Sharon Steel Corp. 90 that CERCLA preempts state corporate dissolu-
tion law. In this case, the government sued Sharon Steel Corporation, 
the owner of a hazardous waste site, and UV Industries, who, as the 
prior owner of the site, had used the property from 1906 until 1971 to 
store tailings from its steel milling and smelting operations. In 1980, 
UV dissolved, selling most of its assets to Sharon Steel.91 Upon disso-
lution, UV set up a trust fund to wind up its affairs and distribute 
assets to the shareholders. As of 1986, when the government filed its 
suit, however, the trust had not distributed all of the corporation's 
remaining assets. UV Industries moved to dismiss the government's 
claim on the ground that it lacked the capacity to be sued based on the 
Maine law under which it was incorporated.92 
The court, however, after examining CERCLA's language and leg-
islative history, held that CERCLA preempts the state corporate dis-
solution law. The court found that the language of CERCLA's 
section 107 provided strong preemptive force, stating: 
[Congress] did not limit the preemptive force of section 107 to state lia-
bility laws, nor is this court willing to undermine congressional intent by 
reading such a restriction into the statute. This court concludes that, if 
the effect of a state capacity statute is to limit the liability of a party 
Congress meant to hold liable for cleanup costs, Congress intended 
CERCLA to preempt it. 93 
This reasoning is consistent with the reasoning used by the courts that 
have held that CERCLA preempts state tort claims immunity acts.94 
The state corporate dissolution law removes capacity to be sued from a 
party that Congress otherwise meant to hold liable for cleanup costs 
under CERCLA, and therefore acts as an obstacle to the fulfillment of 
CERCLA's goals and must be preempted. 
In summary, although an analysis of CERCLA's statutory lan-
guage and legislative history does not yield a conclusive answer to the 
question of CERCLA preemption of state corporate dissolution law, 
the elements of congressional intent that can be found in the legislative 
history support a finding of preemption like that made by the Sharon 
Steel court. First, Congress recognized that hazardous waste cleanup 
was an urgent problem requiring a large amount of resources. 95 Sec-
ond, Congress believed that where possible, the costs of cleanup 
should be borne by those responsible for, or who benefited from, the 
90. 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987). 
91. 681 F. Supp. at 1493. 
92. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1122 (1964), is patterned after MODEL BUSINESS 
CORP. ACT § 105 (1979) and provides a two-year survival period after dissolution beyond which 
claims may not be brought by or against the dissolved corporation. See infra section 111.A.2 for a 
discussion of state corporate dissolution statutes patterned after § 105 of the 1979 Model Act. 
93. 681 F. Supp. at 1498. 
94. See supra Part I.C. 
95. See supra notes 81-82 & 84 and accompanying text. 
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production, storage, or transportation of hazardous wastes.96 
These elements of congressional intent strongly support preemp-
tion of state corporate diss.olution law. Any dissolved corporation that 
would be a potential defendant in a CERCLA suit likely benefited 
from, and should be responsible for remedying, the hazardous wastes 
that are now endangering our environment and health. If the re-
sources recoverable from these dissolved corporations could be used 
for cleanup costs, both of the primary goals noted by Congress would 
be furthered: more resources would be available to clean up more 
sites, and these resources would be recovered from those who benefited 
from cheap disposal of the wastes. Furthermore, allowing preemption 
would further the kind of cost spreading recognized by the Brown 
court and supported by the legislative history as another element of 
congressional intent. As the analysis of corporate dissolution law in 
the next Part demonstrates, because the goals of dissolution law are 
rarely furthered when CERCLA claims are brought within the con-
text of currently written dissolution statutes, preemption by CERCLA 
of state corporate dissolution law is particularly appropriate. 
III. SUING DISSOLVED CORPORATIONS 
In federal court, a corporation's ability to sue and be sued is deter-
mined by the law of the state of incorporation. 97 Some states allow a 
corporation to be sued anytime after dissolution.98 Other states allow 
corporations to sue or be sued anytime after dissolution for claims 
arising before dissolution.99 In states with corporate dissolution stat-
utes of these two types, therefore, corporate dissolution law may not 
stand as an obstacle to CERCLA claims.100 More commonly, how-
ever, a state corporate dissolution statute provides that a corporation 
96. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
97. FED. R. C1v. P. 17(b). This rule has been applied universally to dissolved corporations. 
See 6 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1563 (1971) 
("Although not expressly dealt with in Rule 17(b), the federal courts have held that the capacity 
ofa dissolved corporation to sue and be sued is determined by the law of the state in which it was 
organized."). 
98. For example, Ohio law provides that any claim that accrues against the dissolved corpo-
ration may be brought anytime after dissolution. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § l 70l.88(B) (Baldwin 
1989). New Jersey allows suit to be brought against the dissolved corporation anytime after 
dissolution provided that the Superior Court finds good cause and sufficient assets held by the 
corporation or, through distribution, by one of its shareholders. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:l2-l3 
(West Supp. 1989). Virginia law, which expressly allows suit to be brought anytime for claims 
arising before dissolution, has been interpreted to apply to post-dissolution claims as well. See 
Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 616 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Va. 1985) (post-dissolution claims for 
pre-dissolution acts that cause post-dissolution injuries may be brought against dissolved Virginia 
corporation at least within the five-year period following dissolution in which the corporation 
may gain reinstatement). 
99. See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE§ 2011{Deering1977); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-16-24 (Supp. 
1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-209 (1972). 
100. Whether or not CERCLA claims may be brought against a dissolved corporation in a 
state allowing suit to be brought at any time for claims arising before dissolution will depend on 
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loses its capacity to sue or be sued a set number of years (usually two) 
after dissolution. 101 This type of statute frequently stands as the pri-
mary obstacle to CERCLA suits brought against dissolved corpora-
tions because suit is not brought within the statutory time limit. 102 
State statutes giving corporations the capacity to sue and be sued 
after dissolution were enacted as a reaction to the harshness of the 
common law rule that all actions by and against a corporation were 
abated at dissolution. 103 This Part first briefly discusses these common 
law provisions, including the common law trust fund theory, and then 
examines state statutory provisions as exemplified by the 1979 Model 
Business Corporation Act, 104 and the 1985 Revised Model Business 
Act, 105 respectively. This Part then analyzes the Ninth Circuit's rea-
soning in Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 106 in 
which the court held, based on its understanding of corporate dissolu-
tion law, that CERCLA does not preempt state corporate dissolution 
law. Finally, this Part concludes with a discussion of how CERCLA 
claims fit into the existing framework of suits against dissolved corpo-
rations, arguing that the existing framework is ill-suited for handling 
CERCLA claims because it relies on distinctions between pre-dissolu-
tion and post-dissolution claims that cannot be made with regard to 
claims made under CERCLA. 
A. Common Law and State Statutory Provisions Relating to 
Corporate Dissolution 
1. Common Law Provisions and the Trust Fund Theory 
Under the English common law, all actions both by and against a 
corporation abated upon dissolution and the assets of the corporation 
escheated to the King. 107 In the United States, with the institution of 
the business corporation in the 1800s, the English common law rule 
how a particular court decides the issue of when a claim arises under CERCLA; this issue is 
currently unresolved. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text. 
101. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
102. This Note is concerned only with state corporate dissolution provisions that cut off the 
corporation's liability after dissolution and therefore may frustrate CERCLA claims. In states in 
which corporate dissolution law does not remove liability, CERCLA claims may continue to be 
brought against the dissolved corporation and there is no issue of preemption. 
103. See infra Part III.A.I. 
104. The MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 105 (1979) acts as the model for a great many state 
corporate dissolution statutes. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
105. The revision of the Model Business Corporation Act in 1985 substantially changed the 
dissolution provisions. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr §§ 14.06, 14.07 (1985). How· 
ever, these revised provisions have yet to be adopted by any states. See infra note 134. 
106. 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 
107. See Marcus, Suability of Dissolved Corporations - A Study in Interstate and Federal-
State Relationships, 58 HARV. L. REV. 675, 677-78 (1945) (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA· 
RIES 326 (Cooley's 2d ed. 1879)); Note, Suits By and Against Dissolved Corporations, 48 IOWA L. 
REV. 1006, 1006-09 (1963). 
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was changed so that the assets of the corporation constituted a trust 
fund upon dissolution for creditors and shareholders with outstanding 
claims. 108 This development, known as the trust fund theory, allowed 
a creditor to bring suit against the directors and shareholders of a dis-
solved corporation under the theory that the assets were distributed to 
these shareholders under a lien held by the creditor. Claims brought 
under the trust fund theory were only subject to general statutes of 
limitations applicable to the particular claim asserted. 109 
It is unclear to what extent the common law trust fund theory con-
tinues to exist after the advent of state statutes governing corporate 
dissolution. 110 Although claims clearly covered by statute are con-
trolled by the statutory provisions and barred if not brought within the 
statute's time limitations, 111 some claims against dissolved corpora-
tions do not fall clearly within the statute; for these claims, the argu-
ment for continuing the trust fund theory is still made, especially in 
the field of products liability.112 
108. See Marcus, supra note 107, at 679-80. 
109. See Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. 304 (1853); Drew v. United States, 367 F.2d 828, 830 
(Ct. Cl. 1966) ("Under the general rule known as the 'trust fund theory' it is held that where 
stockholders receive the assets of a corporation upon liquidation and leave the corporation with-
out sufficient assets to pay its creditors, then its stockholders are required to respond to the full 
value of the assets received."); Cowden Mfg. Co. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Ky. 
1972); see also Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability Claims, 
56 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 879-82 (1971); Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy In Search of a 
Defendant - The Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction 
Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV. 321, 327-29 (1976). 
110. One commentator reports that the first state statute governing corporate dissolution was 
enacted in New York in 1811. See Note, supra note 107, at 1008 n.16. A thorough discussion of 
the continued existence of the trust fund theory is beyond the scope of this Note. The point of 
contention is whether a statutory provision continuing corporate liability for a limited time after 
dissolution contains sufficient legislative intent to supplant the trust fund theory completely. See 
Wallach, supra note 109, at 329; Friedlander & Lannie, Post-Dissolution Liabilities of Sharehold-
ers and Directors for Claims Against Dissolved Corporations, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1363, 1370-81 
(1978). 
111. Under the corporate dissolution provisions of most states, pre-dissolution claims are 
expressly covered by the statute. See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text. One commenta-
tor has proposed that for these claims the only difference between suing under the abatement 
statute and suing under the trust fund theory is that the trust fund theory, as an equitable action, 
requires the exhaustion of all legal remedies first, meaning that the plaintiff would have to prove 
that he could not recover from the corporation. See Wallach, supra note 109, at 329 n.32. 
112. Claims arising after a corporation has dissolved are often not addressed clearly by the 
statutory provisions. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. Some commentators have 
argued that the trust fund theory should continue to exist for these claimants. See Friedlander & 
Lannie, supra note 110, at 1369 ("[T]he trust fund theory both by its nature and by its purpose 
should allow claimants with contingent [post-dissolution] claims to recover when those claims 
finally arise."); Henn & Alexander, supra note 109, at 896 ("[T]he statutory application to post-
dissolution claims is so tenuous as to make it more probable that common law and equitable 
principles apply to the extent they are not inconsistent with the statute."). 
The case ofBlanJ<enship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 569, 411 N.E.2d 1153 (1980), 
shows that a court may be reluctant to accept this reasoning. In this case, the plaintiff's hand 
was caught in a machine manufactured by the defendant. The accident occurred in 1976, but the 
defendant corporation had dissolved in 1968. Plaintiff sued both the corporation and its director 
under the common law trust fund theory because the applicable Illinois statutory period for 
152 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:131 
In some instances, legislative intent to supplant the trust fund the-
ory with the statutory remedy may be found. 113 However, in the great 
majority of cases, no legislative intent to supersede the trust fund the-
ory is shown and the courts are left on their own to decide whether, 
and to what extent, the trust fund theory still exists. The trust fund 
theory is important background to the following discussion of CER-
CLA claims against dissolved corporations because it provides an 
analogy for the recovery of claims from shareholders of the dissolved 
corporation. 
2. State Statutory Provisions: Section 105 of the 1979 Model 
Business Corporation Act 
Despite the development of the trust fund theory, the common law 
rule abating all actions by and against dissolved corporations con-
tinued to produce harsh results for those with claims against the dis-
solved corporation. Therefore, the states developed statutory 
provisions giving corporations the capacity to sue and be sued for a 
limited period of time after dissolution. 
The corporate dissolution statutes in many states today are pat-
terned substantially after section 105 of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act ("1979 Model Act"). 114 The relevant portion of the 1979 
Model Act provides: 
The dissolution of a corporation ... shall not take away or impair 
any remedy available to or against such corporation, its directors, of-
ficers, or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability 
incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon 
is commenced within two years after the date of such dissolution. 11 5 
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act of 1985 ("1985 Model 
Act") made substantial changes to this provision,116 but most state 
statutes are patterned after the 1979 Model Act, varying only the 
amount of time in which to bring suit. 117 
claims against dissolved corporations had run. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim, stating, 
"[w]e agree with defendant that extension of the trust fund theory to cover plaintiff's claim 
would mean that the corporation could never completely dissolve but would live on indefinitely 
through its shareholders." 89 Ill. App. 3d at 573, 411 N.E.2d at 1156. The court weighted the 
dissolved corporation's interest in repose more heavily than the plaintiff's interest in recovery. 
113. Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 110, at 1382 (discussing legislative history of Wiscon-
sin Act); Schoone, Shareholder Liability Upon Voluntary Dissolution of Corporation, 44 MARQ. L. 
REV. 415, at 422-23 (1961) (same); Wallach, supra note 109, at 330 (same). 
114. 16A W. FLETCHEJ.l., CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 8169 
(rev. perm. ed. 1988); Henn & Alexander, supra note 109, at 882; Wallach, supra note 109, at 
324-25. See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES§ 1 (2d ed. 1970). 
115. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 105 (1979). 
116. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. 
117. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, 11 12.80 (1988) (providing a five-year period after 
dissolution in which to bring suit). 
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The 1979 Model Act's provision authorizing suits for two years 
after dissolution is typically described as a survival statute, determin-
ing capacity to be sued, and not a statute of limitations. 118 Suit must 
be commenced within two years of dissolution for any claim against 
the dissolved corporation, even if the appropriate statute of limitations 
for the claim is longer. 119 The Model Act thus ameliorates the harsh 
effects of the common law rule of complete abatement of claims at 
dissolution by allowing claimants a restricted period of time after dis-
solution in which to bring claims against the corporation.120 How-
ever, the statutory period is limited to allow the corporation a point of 
repose after which it may be secure in winding up its affairs and dis-
tributing its assets. As stated by one court: 
There should be a definite point in time at which the existence of a cor-
poration and the transaction of its business are terminated. To allow ... 
the continued prosecution of lawsuits perverts the definiteness and or-
derly process of dissolution so as to produce a continuous dribble of busi-
ness activity contrary to the intent of the winding up provisions of the 
statute. 121 
Courts have been unsure about how strictly statutes based on sec-
tion 105 of the 1979 Model Act should be applied. On the one hand, 
because section 105 is a remedial statute, it should be applied liberally 
to benefit claimants. 122 On the other hand, a strict interpretation may 
be appropriate because these statutes abrogate the common law rule 
118. See Gordon v. Loew's, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 398, 400-08 (D.N.J. 1956) (where an action 
was instituted by the stockholders of three dissolved corporations five to eight years after dissolu-
tion, the claims were dismissed because the state law survival period was two years), ajfd. on 
other grounds, 247 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1957). "[The Illinois corporate dissolution provision] was 
'not strictly a statute of limitation but ... a conditional limitation' upon a creditor's right of 
action against a corporation which has been dissolved." 147 F. Supp. at 405 (citations omitted). 
See also Wallach, supra note 109, at 325. The court in Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond 
Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1987), based its decision that CERCLA does not 
preempt state corporate dissolution law on this distinction. See infra notes 136-39 and accompa-
nying text. 
119. See Johnson v. Helicopter & Airplane Serv. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D. Md. 1975) 
("Capacity is the ability of a particular individual or entity to use, or to be brought into, the 
courts ofa forum. It has no direct correlation to the conducting of business, the existence of an 
enforceable right, interest, cause of action, claim or defense .... ") (citations omitted); Schoene, 
supra note 113, at 423; Wallach, supra note 109, at 325. 
120. In Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 115, at 1400, the authors note: "[B]y postponing 
abatement for two years, the survival statute aimed to protect certain claimants against dissolved 
corporations and to protect dissolved corporations with claims, but the protection was limited. 
It extended only to predissolution claims brought within two years of dissolution." See also 
Wallach, supra note 109, at 324. 
121. Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. Iowa 1968) (holding that Iowa 
dissolution law's two-year survival period barred a suit filed three years after dissolution and 
based on a post-dissolution tort even though the corporation was still winding up its affairs); see 
Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 110, at 1400-04; Wallach, supra note 109, at 333. 
122. Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247, 251 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("Statutes 
extending the vitality of a dissolved corporation for purposes of suit are remedial in nature and 
should be given a liberal construction."); Henn & Alexander, supra note 109, at 900; Marcus, 
supra note 107, at 686-87. 
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completely abating claims. 123 
Courts also have had difficulty in applying section 105 (and stat-
utes modeled after it) because its language provides no guidance re-
garding claims that arise after dissolution. 124 Consequently, courts 
that have struggled with post-dissolution claims brought under stat-
utes based on the 1979 Model Act have reached inconsistent and un-
predictable results. 125 These results have ranged from allowing post-
dissolution claims to be brought at any time after dissolution 126 to al-
lowing no post-dissolution claims to be brought whatsoever. 121 
Because the statutes based on the 1979 Model Act generally do not 
address post-dissolution claims, it appears that courts have often de-
cided these claims based on whether the survival period seems unrea-
sonably short for the particular claim at issue. 128 For example, courts 
have allowed claims against dissolved corporations if there is some ele-
ment of self-dealing by the corporation's directors before dissolu-
tion, 129 or if some other contingency has occurred which, in the 
123. See Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 569, 411 N.E.2d 11S3 (1980): 
One of the main purposes of the survival statutes is to extend the life of a corporation for 
two years following dissolution so that suits which ordinarily would have abated may be 
brought by and against the corporation. Once this period extending the existence of the 
corporation has ended, however, the corporation cannot sue or be sued. Consequently, we 
believe that the survival statute reflects a legislative intent to establish a definite point in time 
when a corporation ceases to exist. 
89 Ill. App. 3d at S74, 411 N.E.2d at 11S6 (citations omitted). 
As noted by one commentator, "[t]raditional canons of construction lead to contradictory 
results: statutes extending post-dissolution corporate existence, being in derogation of the com· 
mon law, should be strictly construed; to the extent that they are remedial, they should be liber· 
ally construed." Henn & Alexander, supra note 109, at 898 {footnotes omitted); see also Marcus, 
supra note 107, at 686-87. 
124. The comments to the 198S Model Act admit this deficiency: "Earlier versions of the 
Model Act did not recognize the serious problem created by possible claims that might arise long 
after the dissolution process was completed and the corporate assets delivered to shareholders." 
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.07 comment {198S). 
12S. For a thorough discussion of the options available to, and taken by, courts in this situa-
tion, see Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 110, at 1370-81. 
126. See, e.g., Levy v. Liebling, 238 F.2d SOS (7th Cir. 19S6) (holding that a claim did not 
accrue to shareholders of dissolved corporation until the time of dissolution and therefore was 
not covered by corporate dissolution provision patterned after the Model Act and could be 
brought anytime within the statute of limitations), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957); see also 
Wallach, supra note 109, at 327 n.24. 
127. See Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 9S (N.D. Iowa 1968) (quoting 
Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247, 2SI (N.D. Ohio 196S)) ("'It is, therefore, 
quite clear that under the Model Business Corporation Act, and those state statutes patterned 
after it, a corporation may be sued for pre-dissolution torts only.'"). In Chadwick, however, the 
court was interpreting the Ohio corporate dissolution statute, which differs significantly from the 
1979 Model Act. 239 F. Supp. at 2Sl. 
128. See Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 110, at 1404-08. 
129. See United States v. Palakow, 438 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1971). In Pa/akow, suit was filed 
against a dissolved corporation's director for breach of fiduciary duty when the director retained 
distributed assets of the corporation that were owed to the Small Business Administration. 
Although the state dissolution provision (modeled after § !OS of the 1979 Model Act) covered 
directors of dissolved corporations, the court held that the suit was filed against the director as an 
individual or, alternatively, that such a claim would not have abated at common law and there-
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court's judgment, makes barring the claim after two years seem 
unfair. 130 • 
The failure of the 1979 Model Act to clearly address claims arising 
after dissolution was resolved by the Revised Model Business Corpo-
ration Act of 1985. However, in the large number of states that still 
have corporate dissolution statutes based on section 105 of the 1979 
Model Act, the result of a claim brought after the corporation has 
dissolved is unpredictable. This lack of predictability threatens one of 
the primary goals sought by corporate dissolution law, namely, a fixed 
time after dissolution when shareholders may securely receive assets 
distributed from the corporation. 
3. Corporate Dissolution Under the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act of 1985 
The 1985 Model Act alleviates the problems caused by the 1979 
Model Act by creating a longer survival period and by directly ad-
dressing claims that arise after dissolution. The 1985 Model Act ad-
dresses pre-dissolution and post-dissolution claims separately: section 
14.06 provides for claims that are known at the time of dissolution131 
and section 14.07 provides for claims that are unknown at the time of 
dissolution. 132 
Pre-dissolution claims are generally addressed by section 14.06, be-
cause they are usually known at the time of dissolution. Section 14.06 
requires the dissolving corporation to send a notice of dissolution to all 
known claimants; in the notice, the corporation must indicate a time 
(as short as 120 days) after which no claims may be filed against it. 
For claims unknown at the time of dissolution (which would include 
all post-dissolution claims), section 14.07 of the 1985 Model Act sets a 
five-year period in which claims must be filed. Therefore, the 1985 
Model Act continues to impose an arbitrary cut-off point as a means of 
balancing the interests of the injured claimant against the dissolved 
corporation's interest in repose. The comments to section 14.07 note, 
however, that "it is believed that the great bulk of post-dissolution 
claims will arise during this [five-year] period."133 
fore the statutory limitation did not apply. See also Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 110, at 
1378-81 (discussing Palakow and similar cases). 
130. See, e.g., People v. Parker, 30 Ill. 2d 486, 197 N.E.2d 30 (1964) (the statutory limitation 
does not apply to a claimant who has not received notice of the corporation's intent to dissolve 
where such notice is required by statute). 
131. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 14.06 (1985). 
132. Section 14.07 requires a dissolved corporation to give notice by publication of its disso-
lution. If notice is given, no claims may be brought against the dissolved corporation more than 
five years after the published notice of dissolution. If no published notice is given, then the 
claims are barred only by the applicable statute of limitations. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CORP. ACT § 14.07 (1985). 
133. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.07 comment (1985). 
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Despite the advances made by the 1985 Model Act, 134 it is still 
inadequate for addressing CERCLA claims. Section 14.07 continues 
to place a five-year limitation on claims that are unknown at the time 
of dissolution. Therefore, the Model Act does little to alleviate the 
problem of CERCLA claims against dissolved corporations because 
many of these claims may not be known until long after the five-year 
period has elapsed. Much of the hazardous waste dumping which 
needs to be cleaned up now was undertaken thirty or more years 
ago. 135 It is highly likely that many of the corporations that were gen-
erating, transporting, and storing these hazardous substances at that 
time are dissolved now. If a five-year limit after dissolution is placed 
on CERCLA claims against these corporations, many such claims will 
never be litigated. · 
B. Corporate Dissolution Law Applied to CERCLA Claims: Levin 
Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co. 
The Ninth Circuit's denial of preemption in Levin Metals Corp. v. 
Parr-Richmond Terminal Co. 136 turned on its formalistic understand-
ing of the nature of corporate dissolution law. In Levin Metals, the 
plaintiff sought recovery of $600,000 in costs it had incurred in clean-
ing its land of pesticides and hazardous chemicals that had polluted 
the land and surrounding water. The defendant, Parr-Richmond Ter-
minal Company, later doing business as Parr Industrial, had previ-
ously owned the land and released chemicals there from 1947 to 1981 
in the process of its pesticide manufacturing business. Parr Industrial, 
however, dissolved in 1971 under a California dissolution provision 
that allows dissolved corporations to be sued anytime after dissolution 
based on a cause of action arising prior to dissolution. 137 The court, 
however, characterized CERCLA claims as arising after dissolution in 
this case, because CERCLA was enacted after the corporation had 
dissolved. 138 Therefore, according to the court, California dissolution 
134. Another consideration is that the 1985 Model Act's separate provision for claims arising 
after dissolution has not yet been adopted by any state. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 114, at 
§§ 8143, 8148. Most states continue to follow the 1979 Model Act. See supra note 114. 
135. In United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., the dumping that necessitated cleanup was be-
gun in 1906. 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1493 (D. Utah 1987). In Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond 
Terminal Co., storage of hazardous chemicals started in 1947. 817 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 
1987). See also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (D. Minn. 
1982) (dumping began in 1917); s. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & c. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN 
AMERICA 7 (1982) (listing amounts of hazardous waste production in United States since the 
end of World War II). 
136. 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 
137. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011 (Deering 1977) provides: "In all cases where a corporation 
has been dissolved, the shareholders may be sued in the corporate name of such corporation 
upon any cause of action against the corporation arising prior to its dissolution." 
138. The court stated that "the etfect of [CERCLA's] retroactivity is that a cause of action 
may arise after CERCLA's enactment, based on pre·enactment conduct. Therefore, since CER-
CLA was enacted after Parr Industrial's dissolution, Levin's cause of action logically arose after 
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law barred suit against Parr-Richmond. 
The court devoted only one paragraph of its opinion to the plain-
tiff's preemption claim, stating: 
Levin's preemption argument turns on its characterization of the Cali-
fornia law here involved as law limiting imposition of liability. A more 
accurate characterization is that the law determines capacity to be sued. 
Levin's interpretation, if followed, would prevent courts from looking to 
state law to determine whether a dissolved corporation could be sued in 
any case involving a federal cause of action. We reject this reasoning 
and hold that CERCLA does not preempt California law determining 
capacity to be sued.139 
For the Levin Metals court, therefore, the fact that corporate dissolu-
tion law acts as a survival statute and not as a statute of limitations 
was determinative in deciding whether the state law was preempted. 
The distinction made by the Levin Metals court, although correct 
as a matter of corporate dissolution law, is irrelevant to the analysis of 
preemption. The court in United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 140 refus-
ing to follow the· Ninth Circuit, termed the differentiation between 
limiting the liability of a party and determining its capacity to be sued 
"a distinction without a difference."141 The Sharon Steel court ex-
plained that "[e]very statute limiting liability defines, at least in part, 
one's capacity to be sued, and every statute limiting one's capacity to 
be sued also limits liability."142 The court reasoned that CERCLA 
preemption of state corporate dissolution law does not mean that 
every federal statute preempts state corporate dissolution law, stating 
that "[o]nly where, as here, Congress clearly expresses its intention to 
supersede the general capacity provisions would a court be free to ig-
nore state capacity law."143 As recognized by the Sharon Steel court, 
the dire consequences predicted by the Ninth Circuit as a result of 
CERCLA preemption of state corporate dissolution law are simply 
not going to occur because all federal statutes do not evidence the kind 
of broad, retroactive, remedial intent shown by CERCLA. 
For the Ninth Circuit, a formalistic understanding of corporate 
dissolution law was central to its holding that CERCLA does not pre-
empt state corporate dissolution law. However, as next discussed, this 
formalistic analysis is misplaced when applied to CERCLA claims. 
CERCLA claims simply do not fit within the general framework of 
corporate dissolution law, and therefore corporate dissolution's for-
malistic distinctions ought not apply. 
the dissolution, and may not now be asserted against Parr Industrial." 817 F.2d at 1451 (empha-
sis in original). 
139. 817 F.2d at 1451 (emphasis in original). 
140. 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987). 
141. 681 F. Supp. at 1497. 
142. 681 F. Supp. at 1497. 
143. 681 F. Supp. at 1498. 
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C. CERCLA Claims Within the Existing Framework of Corporate 
Dissolution Law 
Fitting CERCLA claims into the existing framework for claims 
against dissolved corporations is problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, although most corporate dissolution statutes hinge on whether a 
claim arises before or after dissolution, CERCLA claims are not easily 
characterized as either pre-dissolution or post-dissolution claims. Sec-
ond, when considering the purpose of corporate dissolution statutes, 
the concerns with a CERCLA claim may be different from those aris-
ing out of other claims because the liability under CERC}:.,A is retro-
active and could not have been predicted by a responsible party at the 
time the action initiating liability was taken; therefore similar treat-
ment of dissolved and solvent corporations is fair. 
1. CERCLA Claims Cannot Be Characterized as Pre-Dissolution or 
Post-Dissolution 
Typically, it is important to characterize a claim against a dis-
solved corporation as arising either before or after dissolution because 
corporate survival statutes in most states directly apply only to pre-
dissolution claims. 144 In addition, determining when a claim arises is 
important, generally, because it dictates when the statute of limitations 
for the claim begins to run. 
CERCLA actions to recover cleanup costs, however, have no limi-
tations period. The sections of CERCLA establishing and describing 
the use of the Superfund do contain a limitations period. 145 In United 
States v. Mottolo, 146 however, a New Hampshire district court held 
that this statute of limitations applied only to claims against the 
Superfund for reimbursement and to claims by the government for 
damages to natural resources, not to actions brought under section 
107 of CERCLA for the recovery of cleanup and response costs. 147 
144. See supra notes 118-30, and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of 
differentiating between pre-dissolution and post-dissolution claims. 
145. When CERCLA was originally passed, the statute of limitations was set at three years. 
However, SARA lengthened the period to six years. CERCLA § l 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d) 
(1982 & Supp. V 1988). 
146. 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985). 
147. In Mottolo, the state of New Hampshire filed a CERCLA § 107 claim five years after it 
had cleaned up a site owned by the defendant. The defendant moved to have the suit dismissed 
because it was filed after the three-year statute of limitations set by§ l 12(d) had run. The court, 
however, after an extensive analysis of CERCLA's language and legislative history, 605 F. Supp. 
at 901-10, held that the statute oflimitations in§ 112(d) did not apply to judicial actions brought 
under § 107, but only limited claims against the Superfund and for damages to natural resources. 
As stated by the court, "[section l 12(d) of CERCLA] is properly interpreted as imposing a three-
year statute of limitations upon all claims against the Fund and also upon judicial actions for 
damages to natural resources, but not upon judicial actions for reimbursement of removal, reme-
dial, or response costs." 605 F. Supp. at 902. This holding was subsequently adopted by another 
district court in United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 213 (W.D. Mo. 
1985). 
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Because CERCLA section 107 actions have no limitations period, 
there has been no judicial determination of when CERCLA claims 
begin or end. Therefore, there is uncertainty about whether they are 
pre-dissolution or post-dissolution claims for purposes of applying cor-
porate dissolution law. In the two cas~ that have discussed CERCLA 
preemption, the corporations being sued had dissolved before CER-
CLA was even enacted. 148 One of the courts maintained that the 
claim could not have arisen before the date of CERCLA's enact-
ment, 149 and the other court failed to address the issue. 150 
Because of this confusion regarding when CERCLA claims arise, 
many corporate dissolution statutes, as they presently exist, are of no 
help in resolving CERCLA claims against a dissolved corporation. 
States with statutes based on section 105 of the 1979 Model Act 
clearly address only claims that arise prior to dissolution. A CER-
CLA claim could arise after dissolution: at the time the injury (con-
tamination) was discovered; when clean up costs are incurred; or, 
arguably, at the time of the injury (disposal, manufacture, or transpor-
tation). No matter which interpretation is correct, as long as the issue 
is unsettled, shareholders receiving assets have no certainty that CER-
CLA liability will not later attach to the assets. The distinction be-
tween pre-dissolution and post-dissolution claims under CERCLA 
also loses its force because CERCLA claims, unlike most other law-
suits, rely on a federal statute that imposes retroactive liability. 
2. CERCLA's Retroactive Liability 
CERCLA was enacted in 1980, but it imposes liability for actions 
taken before the statute's enactment. 151 Congress had already set 
standards for the ongoing disposal of hazardous wastes with the enact-
ment of RCRA in 1976.152 Through CERCLA, Congress expressly 
intended to hold companies liable for their past conduct so that 
cleanup costs for existing sites could be paid by those who had bene-
fited from cheap disposal of the hazardous wastes. 153 A unique attri-
148. In Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., the corporation at issue, Parr 
Industrial, had dissolved nine years before CERCLA's enactment. 817 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 
1987). In United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., the corporation at issue, UV Industries, had 
dissolved only nine months before CERCLA's enactment. 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1493 (D. Utah 
1987). 
149. The Levin Metals court failed to decide the specific issue, but stated that a cause of 
action could not arise prior to the date of CERCLA's enactment. 817 F.2d at 1451. See supra 
notes 136-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
150. The court in Sharon Steel, finding the state corporate dissolution law preempted, did not 
need to address the issue of when the claim arose. 681 F. Supp. at 1496-99. 
151. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-33 
(8th Cir. 1986) ("Although CERCLA does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it is manifestly 
clear that Congress intended CERCLA to have retroactive effect."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 
(1987). 
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982). See supra note 37. 
153. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of CERCLA's purposes and legislative history. 
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bute of any CERCLA claim is that, prior to 1980, no corporation, at 
the time the toxic substance was released, had any knowledge that 
liability would later be incurred for that release. 154 Congress believed 
that such liability should be imposed nevertheless, because these com-
panies had benefited from the production of these substances and from 
being able to dispose of them in a relatively cheap manner.155 
The retroactive liability imposed by CERCLA is in tension with 
the certainty goals of corporate dissolution laws. Corporate dissolu-
tion statutes seek to provide certainty for shareholders by assuring 
that assets received by shareholders will not have to be relinquished 
later to satisfy claims against the dissolved corporation.156 However, 
CERCLA's policy choice is to impose liability for the cleanup costs of 
hazardous wastes on those who manufactured, stored, or transported 
those substances even though, at the time of manufacture, storage, or 
transportation, those parties did not know and could not have known 
that liability would later be imposed for their actions. Therefore, sim-
ply by enacting CERCLA, Congress chose to upset certainty for par-
ticular parties as to whether or not liability would be imposed on them 
for actions taken in the past. Although the harm to expectations is 
greater, the actual monetary damages of a CERCLA suit against the 
shareholders of a corporation that has dissolved and distributed its 
assets are no greater than those of a CERCLA claim against an operat-
ing company for actions it took twenty or more years ago.157 
In addition, pursuing the goal of shareholder certainty in retaining 
assets distributed by a dissolved corporation is nonsensical when ap-
plied to CERCLA claims. Shareholders in such instances merely re-
place the ongoing corporation as the parties who have benefited from 
the production of the hazardous wastes and should now pay for the 
danger those wastes pose to our environment and health. Thus it is 
consistent with the congressional policy that the beneficiaries of inex-
pensive disposal now pay cleanup costs for those shareholders to be 
liable. In summary, it is clear that CERCLA claims against dissolved 
corporations cannot be meaningfully analyzed or resolved within the 
154. Some authors argue that the corporations actually did know of the potential danger 
posed by these substances at the time of their release. See, e.g., S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. 
POPE, supra note 135 at 94, 131 (1982) (providing example of corporation that knew of potential 
dangers posed by building on land that it previously had used for chemical-waste dumping). 
However, there was no known legal liability for their release before the enactment of CERCLA 
and RCRA. 
155. See supra Part 11.B for a discussion of CERCLA's legislative history. 
156. See Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. Iowa 1968); Friedlander & 
Lannie, supra note 110, at 1401. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the purposes of corporate dissolution statutes. 
157. The risk to the ongoing corporation is potentially much greater because, while a corpo-
ration may be forced into bankruptcy by a large CERCLA claim against it, a shareholder's 
liability would be limited to the amount of the corporation's assets the shareholder had received. 
See infra note 177 for two recent articles discussing CERCLA claims within a bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
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usual framework of suits against dissolved corporations because the 
policy choice of retroactive liability embodied in CERCLA is contrary 
to the primary goal of corporate dissolution law of promoting cer-
tainty for shareholders. 
The resolution of CERCLA claims within this framework (which 
depends on the differentiation between pre-dissolution and post-disso-
lution claims) is hindered by the lack of a consensus as to when CER-
CLA claims arise. Moreover, the Levin Metal court's focus on 
corporate capacity to be sued and fear that preemption by CERCLA 
will provide precedent for preemption of dissolution law by every fed-
eral statute is misplaced because there are few, if any, other federal 
statutes that solve such large national problems through the imposi-
tion of retroactive liability. CERCLA preemption of state corporate 
dissolution law is the only way to effectuate Congress' goal of placing 
the costs of cleaning up hazardous wastes on those who are responsi-
ble for, or have benefited from, those wastes. 
IV. A WORKABLE SOLUTION: CERCLA PREEMPTION OF STATE 
CORPORATE DISSOLUTION LAW 
This Part attempts to devise a workable solution to the problem of 
CERCLA claims against dissolved corporations through the means of 
CERCLA preemption of state corporate dissolution law. Section A 
examines the goals that an optimal solution to the problem of CER-
CLA suits against dissolved corporations would serve and argues that 
there is a shared ground between the apparently conflicting goals of 
CERCLA and corporate dissolution statutes. Section B explores the 
contours of a solution that would meet the optimal goals. This section 
argues that a legislative solution differentiating between corporations 
based on whether they dissolved before or after CERCLA's enactment 
would promote the most equitable solution, but recognizes that such a 
differentiation is impossible to make within the current contours of the 
law and concludes that the solution of preemption also serves the opti-
mal goals. In section C, this Part confronts the practical and concep-
tual problems of recovering assets from shareholders of the dissolved 
corporation that flow from preemption. This section argues that 
analogous authority points to the resolution of this problem and that 
the conceptual problem is not as large as it may first appear. The 
section concludes that any practical problems that do flow from pre-
emption are more than outweighed by the goal of preventing corpora-
tions from dissolving in order to escape CERCLA liability. 
A. Optimal Goals 
Defining the optimal goals of a solution to the problem of CER-
CLA claims against dissolved corporations may seem impossible be-
cause the goals of CERCLA are in direct conflict with the goals of 
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corporate dissolution law. On the one hand, CERCLA's primary goal 
is to remedy the problem of inactive hazardous waste sites by imposing 
the costs of cleanup on those responsible for generating, transporting, 
or disposing of the hazardous materials. 158 CERCLA seeks to achieve 
this goal through imposing liability retroactively, without fault, for ac-
tions taken by companies or individuals many years before the statute 
was even passed. 159 Corporate dissolution law, on the other hand, 
seeks to provide an organized and certain path for corporations to end 
their affairs and thereby to ensure that shareholders may receive assets 
subsequently distributed without a threat of later liability.160 To fur-
ther this goal, most corporate dissolution statutes cut off all liability at 
the end of a specified time period.161 The two areas of laws operate on 
different and conflicting principles: while CERCLA imposes liability 
today for a continuing problem caused by actions taken years ago, cor-
porate dissolution law seeks to provide a definite end to liability for 
actions taken in the past. 
Within these conflicting goals, however, there is a shared ground. 
CERCLA's goals could be substantially furthered by a solution that 
would keep the problem from expanding by preventing corporations 
from dissolving to escape liability. 162 The goals of corporate dissolu-
tion law would be substantially furthered by a solution that allows 
corporations seeking dissolution to provide for potential CERCLA lia-
bility in an orderly fashion before dissolution is final. 163 
An optimal solution to the problem would prevent a corporation 
from escaping CERCLA liability through dissolution and would en-
courage these corporations to provide for potential CERCLA liabili-
ties before dissolution is complete; thereby allowing a corporation with 
potential environmental liabilities to make some provision for those 
liabilities before dissolving to ensure that its shareholders have some 
security from CERCLA liability in the future. For corporations that 
have already dissolved, this solution would provide a balance that 
158. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
159. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
162. CERCLA's goals would be somewhat harmed by this because some funds from poten-
tially responsible parties would be lost. However, the possibility that corporations in existence 
today will be able to dissolve in order to escape liability is a major concern. The court in United 
Stales v. Sharon Steel Corp. seemed most troubled about this eventuality, stating "[i]f for exam-
ple, under state law a dissolved corporation lacked the capacity to be sued, any corporation could 
escape CERCLA liability simply by dissolving before the government brought suit, perhaps to 
incorporate again after someone else had paid to clean up its hazardous wastes." 681 F. Supp. 
1492, 1498 (D. Utah 1987). 
163. Any solution that increases the predictability of result when a CERCLA claim is 
brought against a dissolved corporation would further the primary goal of corporate dissolution 
law which is to protect a period of repose for shareholders. However, corporate dissolution law 
does not aim to provide a mechanism through which a corporation may escape its potential 
liabilities. 
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would promote the cleanup of hazardous waste sites using funds from 
parties responsible for the wastes (rather than taken from the taxpay-
ers) while leaving some measure of security for shareholders who have 
received assets. 
B. The Contours of the Solution 
The ground shared by common goals of CERCLA and corporate 
dissolution statutes converges on whether the corporation had knowl-
edge, before dissolution, of potential CERCLA liability. This com-
mon ground is based on a differentiation between corporations, which 
is based on whether dissolution occurred before or after the enactment 
of CERCLA. A solution based on this common ground, however, 
could only be attained through legislation because the framework of 
preemption does not allow for this differentiation to be made. Until a 
legislative solution is reached, however, preemption best furthers the 
primary goal of preventing corporations from dissolving in order to 
.escape CERCLA liability. 
The following section first discusses a legislative solution to the 
problem of CERCLA claims against dissolved corporations, arguing 
that a legislative solution that differentiates between corporations 
based on whether they dissolved before or after CERCLA's enactment 
would best achieve the optimal goals of a solution. This section next 
establishes that this differentiation cannot be made outside of legisla-
tive action and concludes with the realization that until a legislative 
solution is reaphed, CERCLA preemption of state corporate dissolu-
tion law best furthers the optimal goals. 
1. A Legislative Solution 
A legislative solution to the problem of CERCLA liability for dis-
solved corporations could be achieved by changing the definition of a 
"person" who can be held liable under CERCLA. 164 This solution 
would differentiate between corporations that dissolved before CER-
CLA's enactment and those that dissolved after CERCLA's enact-
ment. Currently CERCLA identifies a "corporation" as a "party" 
who may be held liable for cleanup and response costs. 165 The defini-
tion could be changed to read: " 'person' means a . . . corporation 
existing under the laws of any state, as of or after the effective date of 
this chapter." If this change were instituted, CERCLA would no 
164. CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (Supp. V 1987), defines "person" for the 
purposes,ofCERCLA. Section 107 ofCERCLA depends on this definition to impose liability on 
"any person" who owned or operated a hazardous waste site, transported hazardous wastes for 
disposal, or contracted for the disposal of hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987). 
See supra note 15 for a more complete text of this section. 
165. The definition currently reads, "'person' means [a] ... corporation." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(21) (Supp. V 1987). 
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longer impose liability on corporations that dissolved prior to its en-
actment on December 11, 1980. 166 A legislative solution based on this 
differentiation would best further the optimal goals identified above 
from both an equitable and a practical standpoint. 
Imposing CERCLA liability on corporations dissolving after 
CERCLA's enactment promotes fundamental fairness because the di-
rectors of any corporation that dissolved after the enactment of CER-
CLA had knowledge of the possibility of CERCLA liability and could 
have provided for that liability before dissolving. Corporations that 
dissolved before CERCLA's enactment, however, had no knowledge 
of potential liability and therefore no way to prepare for resolution of 
that liability. 
From a practical standpoint, a legislative solution which differenti-
ates between corporations based on whether they dissolved before or 
after CERCLA's enactment also appears to satisfy best the identified 
optimal goals. This solution recognizes that with the passage of time, 
the assets of a dissolved corporation become more difficult to trace and 
recover. For a corporation that dissolved before CERCLA's enact-
ment almost nine years ago, the transaction costs of bringing and 
maintaining a suit against shareholders are likely very high, which de-
creases the amount of funds that would actually go towards 
cleanup. 167 The passage of time also increases the shareholders' inter-
est in repose and lessens the deterrent aspect gained by imposing liabil-
ity on dissolved corporations who knew or should have known about 
CERCLA liabilities and provided for them prior to dissolution. 
A legislative solution that would redefine a "person" subject to 
CERCLA liability to exclude corporations that dissolved before the 
statute's enactment, would strike the best balance between the inter-
ests of corporate dissolution law and the pressing national need to 
clean up hazardous waste sites. However, such a legislative change 
does not appear to be approaching and until it does, the avenue left 
166. Under this legislative solution, the defendant corporations in United States v. Sharon 
Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987), and Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Ter-
minal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) would both escape CERCLA liability because both 
corporations dissolved before CERCLA was enacted. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying 
text. This solution might seem inequitable for corporations that dissolved only months before 
CERCLA was enacted and conceivably could have dissolved to escape liability that appeared 
likely to be imposed as Congress considered CERCLA. See Sharon Steel, 681 F. Supp. at 1498 
(corporation at issue dissolved "while Congress was considering forerunners of CERCLA"). 
However, for ease of administration, and the efficiency gains of not having to prove subjective 
intent, drawing the line at the date of CERCLA's enactment seems to be the most equitable 
solution. This differentiation represents a compromise position to the extent that it runs counter 
to CERCLA's basic scheme of imposing liability without fault. However, as a practical matter, 
the amount that would be recovered from corporations that dissolved before CERCLA's enact-
ment nearly nine years ago is most likely de minimis. 
167. Conceivably, if a large number of shareholders received assets, the costs in tracking 
down the shareholders might be larger than the amount that would eventually be recovered. 
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open to the courts that are faced with this problem is that of 
preemption. 
2. A Preemptive Solution 
Although the optimal goals of a solution appear to be best ad-
dressed through the legislative solution proposed above, within the 
current framework of CERCLA and state corporate dissolution law a 
differentiation between corporations dissolving prior to CERCLA's 
enactment and those dissolving after CERCLA's enactment is not pos-
sible. Preemption could not be used to differentiate between corpora-
tions based on when dissolution occurred; if the state dissolution law 
were preempted by CERCLA, any previously existing corporation 
could be held to be a responsible party under the statute. Therefore, 
the choice is one between upsetting the repose of dissolved corpora-
tions and their shareholders through CERCLA preemption of state 
corporate dissolution law, or allowing corporations to escape CER-
CLA liability through dissolution if CERCLA does not preempt the 
state procedures. 
Preemption meets the primary goal of the optimal solution by 
preventing corporations from dissolving to escape CERCLA liability. 
The solution of preemption, howeyer, also raises the specter of impos-
ing liability on shareholders of the dissolved corporation whose assets 
have already been distributed. This is a problem that has troubled the 
courts but, as discussed below, it is not so grave as to overshadow the 
important national goals of CERCLA. 
C. Shareholder Liability: A Conceptual and Practical Problem 
The practical and conceptual problems of allowing a dissolved cor-
poration to be sued loom large in a discussion of CERCLA preemp-
tion of state corporate dissolution law. The courts that have addressed 
the issue have been troubled by the possibility of imposing liability on 
a dissolved corporation that has already distributed assets to its share-
holders. As the cases indicate, some courts have been unwilling to 
allow recovery of cleanup costs from a dissolved corporation that. has 
already distributed its assets. 168 Even the district court in United 
168. The Eighth Circuit discussed the issue of whether a CERCLA claim could be recovered 
from assets distributed to shareholders in the case of United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). The corpora-
tion at issue, NEP ACCO, had forfeited its charter and distributed its assets to shareholders 
without filing for dissolution. The court held that the corporation still had the capacity to be 
sued, but as a practical matter, a recovery would be unlikely. The court stated: "Because 
NEP ACCO's assets have already been liquidated and distributed to its shareholders, however, it 
is unlikely that the government will be able to recover anything from NEPACCO." 810 F.2d at 
742. Similarly, it is possible that in Levin Metals the fact that the corporation's assets had been 
distributed and suit was brought against former shareholders played a role in the court's refusal 
to consider seriously the plaintiff's preemption argument. 817 F.2d at 1451. 
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States v. Sharon Steel Corp. 169 refused to address the issue of whether 
its holding of preemption would allow a judgment to be recovered 
from the corporation's former shareholders.17° 
However, analogous authority exists both for the recovery of assets 
from shareholders of a dissolved corporation, and for the direct liabil-
ity of shareholders as responsible parties under CERCLA. Corporate 
dissolution law provides for the reclamation of assets distributed to 
shareholders at dissolution both in the common law trust fund the-
ory 171 and in some state statutory dissolution provisions. 172 Within 
CERCLA jurisprudence, shareholders of a responsible corporation 
may be held directly liable if they have actively participated in the 
affairs of the corporation. 173 The courts' conceptual problem, there-
fore, of holding shareholders responsible is not as overwhelming as it 
may first appear. 
Moreover, as a practical concern, this problem can be placed in 
perspective by recognizing that in the class of dissolved corporations, 
as in any other class of potential defendants, some will be judgment 
proof. This was the view of the Sharon Steel court, which held that 
the trust fund established by the corporation at dissolution could be 
sued even if it contained no assets, stating, 
[T]he fact that a defendant may be judgment proof does not affect its 
capacity to be sued. It may be that the trust has all the assets. If [the 
corporation] is ultimately found liable, the government may have to de-
cide whom it can collect from - the trust or the corporation. 174 
The fact that a certain defendant within a category is judgment proof 
does not mean that the entire category of defendants should not have 
the capacity to be sued; it merely means that plaintiffs deciding 
whether to sue must consider whether a particular defendant will 
eventually be able to pay any judgment entered. The risk, therefore, of 
judgment proof defendants should not keep the courts from imposing 
liability upon shareholders of dissolved corporations that are other-
wise liable under CERCLA. 
169. 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987). 
170. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text for a description of the trust fund theory. 
171. See Sharon Steel 681 F. Supp. at 1499. Because the corporation's trust fund still ex-
isted, addressing such a question would be premature, according to the court. The issue of 
whether the government could recover cleanup costs from assets already distributed to share-
holders was "best left for another day." 681 F. Supp. at 1499. 
172. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE§ 2011(Deering1977); N.J. STAT. ANN§ 14A:l2-13 (West 
Supp. 1989). 
173. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (principal share-
holder held directly responsible because of decision made, as president of the corporation, ille-
gally to dispose of hazardous wastes). See also Comment, The Threat to Im•estment in the 
Hazardous Waste Industry: An Analysis of Individual and Corporate Shareholder Liability Under 
CERCLA, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 585, 602-18 (shareholders of corporations are held directly re-
sponsible for CERCLA liability where they have control over or active participation in decisions 
regarding disposal of hazardous wastes). 
174. 681 F. Supp. at 1498. 
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Allowing suits against former shareholders of the dissolved corpo-
ration is a logical application of Congress' purpose in passing CER-
CLA and promotes CERCLA's goals. If shareholders of dissolved 
corporations are liable for cleanup costs, there will be another source 
of funds available to clean up hazardous waste sites, thus fulfilling 
Congress' intent to clean up as many of these sites as possible through 
recovering costs from those who had benefited from the hazardous 
waste industry in the past.175 Holding shareholders liable is a logical 
application of this idea because a corporation that benefited from haz-
ardous waste production, storage, or transportation, but dissolved 
before providing for cleanup of the hazardous wastes has merely 
passed these benefits on to the former shareholders in the form of 
greater assets at dissolution. 176 The shareholders, therefore, step into 
the shoes of the corporation as the party that Congress intends should 
pay the cleanup costs.177 The shareholders' liability would not extend 
past the amount of assets actually received from the corporation and 
therefore would be limited.11s 
As for corporations now facing dissolution, CERCLA preemption 
of state corporate dissolution law would provide an incentive for these 
corporations to take care of potential CERCLA liabilities before disso-
lution. This is consistent with the goal of dissolution law to allow the 
corporation to wind up its affairs before dissolving.179 It is also consis-
tent with the goals of CERCLA because, through preemption, corpo-
rations would have an incentive to provide for cleanup before 
dissolution. If the directors of a corporation know that after dissolu-
tion the corporation's former shareholders will be liable for cleanup 
175. CERCLA's policy choice was that any person involved in the generation, disposal, or 
transportation of hazardous wastes before regulation benefited from past cheap disposal methods. 
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
176. A related consideration is that of the corporation that, upon dissolution, sells its assets 
to another corporation. These cases, however, are analyzed within the scope of parent corpora-
tion liability and are beyond the scope of this discussion. For a detailed analysis of parent corpo-
ration liability under CERCLA, see Note, Liability of Parent Corporations For Hazardous Waste 
Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1986). 
177. This is in contrast to CERCLA claims against corporations in bankruptcy proceedings. 
There has been a great deal of literature addressing the issue of CERCLA claims within bank-
ruptcy, arguing over whether CERCLA claims should be dischargeable and what priority they 
should have in the proceedings. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Regulation, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1585-1601 (1986) (arguing that CERCLA claims should be placed ahead 
of all other claims in a bankruptcy proceeding in order to reflect the true costs of investment in 
these industries); cf Funsten & Hernandez, The Toxic Waste Generator in Bankruptcy: Should 
Environmental Cleanup Costs Be Given A ['riority?, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (1986-87) (arguing 
that CERCLA claims should be dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding). The main objection 
for those arguing that CERCLA claims should not have a priority in bankruptcy is that to give 
them a priority merely leaves other innocent creditors with unsatisfied claims and does not, 
therefore, actually make the corporation pay for cleanup. See id. at 142-44. In the dissolution 
context, on the other hand, those paying the cleanup costs are actually those who have benefited 
in the past from the production of these hazardous wastes. 
178. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 14.07(d)(2) (1985). 
179. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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costs, the directors will have an incentive before dissolution to clean 
up the wastes, provide a trust fund from which cleanup costs can be 
recovered later, or inform the shareholders at the time of distribution 
that they may be liable for future cleanup costs. 180 This would further 
CERCLA's objectives by encouraging the corporation to provide for 
cleanup of hazardous wastes before dissolution and by not allowing a 
corporation to escape liability through dissolution. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted CERCLA to provide a comprehensive solution 
to the significant problem of inactive hazardous waste sites. Congress 
intended that these sites, which are endangering our health and envi-
ronment, be cleaned up with funds from parties who had created or 
benefited from them, rather than with funds from taxpayers. The cor-
porate dissolution provisions of many states, however, frustrate this 
intent and allow corporations to escape CERCLA liability through 
dissolution. A legislative solution differentiating between corporations 
based on whether dissolution occurred before or after CERCLA's en-
actment would resolve the problem most clearly and equitably. How-
ever, until legislative action is taken, CERCLA preemption of state 
corporate dissolution law is the best solution to this problem. The 
resulting disruption to the goals of corporate dissolution law is not 
unprecedented, and is more than justified by the urgent national policy 
goals embodied in CERCLA. 
- Audrey J. Anderson 
180. If CERCLA does preempt state corporate dissolution law, trustees of a corporation who 
did not take such precautions before distribution might be liable to shareholders for a breach of 
fiduciary responsibility. See 1985 Model Act at§ 14.06(a) & § 14.07 comment ("Directors must 
generally discharge or make provision for discharging alJ of the corporation's liabilities before 
distributing the remaining assets to the shareholders."). 
